Visualizing the Holocaust by Szász, Anna Lujza
1 
 
Anna Lujza Szász 
Visualizing the Holocaust 
A theoretiĐal iŶtroduĐtioŶ to the suďĐhapter ͚‘epreseŶtiŶg the ‘oŵa HoloĐaust͛   
 
 
͞TheǇ also killed the Jeǁs eǀeƌǇǁheƌe͟, saǇs ‘udolf KƌaszŶai of ‘oŵa oƌigiŶ, ďoƌŶ iŶ PéĐs, HuŶgaƌǇ iŶ 
1927.1 Krasznai, together with the other Roma in the area, were collected in the beginning of the 
1940s by the gendarmerie and transported by train to a ghetto at Pélportpuszta. Following a few 
month of forced labour, they were taken on freight trains to a lager Đlose to LiŶz. ͞TheǇ had takeŶ 
fifteeŶ oƌ tǁeŶtǇ people to dig the pit, the otheƌs eŶĐiƌĐled theŵ͟, KƌaszŶai ĐoŶtiŶues. ͞AŶd theŶ 
they were shot in the head with machine-guns, they fell in the pit. I only saw dead bodies, they 
poured lime on them, the cart went, they put soil on it, and good bye! Isaw it in Dachau in forty-five. 
By then the camp was closed down, we were taken there to work. We buried people. Shovel and 
spade in our hands and we buried them. We were there for three or four days, we covered the 
ďodies, that͛s it. With shoǀel aŶd spade. We pushed soil oŶ theŵ. That ǁas it. HeǇ, ŵǇ God, it is Ŷo 
use speakiŶg aďout it. It ǁas ŵiseƌaďle. Miseƌaďle.͟  
͞I [oŶlǇ] saǁ ;...Ϳ͟ aŶd iŶ KƌaszŶai͛s testiŵoŶǇ ͚seeiŶg͛ seeŵs to ďe a self-evident and banal 
act of communication in the silence that was imposed by isolation. Also, in order to remember he has 
to ͚aŶiŵate͛ the past aŶd Đoŵpƌess it iŶto iŵages suĐh as the ͞dead ďodies͟, the ͞liŵe͟, the ͞Đaƌt͟ oƌ 
the ͞eŶtoŵďŵeŶt͟. The aƌt of seeiŶg, aƌgue “hoshaŶa Felman and Dori Laub in their book 
Testimony2, is strongly related to the experience of witnessing in the Western world. In order to gain 
an objective knowledge in historiography3 on a certain event one shall occupy the cognitive position 
of seeing which then becomes the source of historical realism. Seeing since the Enlightment, as a 
precondition of knowledge, evokes truth and authenticity4 on the one hand, on the other implies the 
ageŶĐǇ of the ͚I͛. It suggests the possiďilitǇ aŶd ŶeĐessitǇ of seeiŶg aŶd the framing and transmission 
of the visual elements into understanding. However in the case of the Holocaust, as Felman and Laub 
ǁƌite, the teŶsioŶ lies ďetǁeeŶ ǁitŶessiŶg that is ͞ĐeŶtƌal to the HoloĐaust eǆpeƌieŶĐe͟5 and that the 
HoloĐaust is ͞aŶ eǀeŶt ǁithout a ǁitŶess͟6 siŶĐe theƌe ǁas ͞histoƌiĐallǇ Ŷo ǁitŶess to the HoloĐaust, 
eitheƌ fƌoŵ outside oƌ fƌoŵ iŶside the eǀeŶt͟7. They argue that the Holocaust was a historical assault 
of seeing8: the main actors of the events – the victims, the bystanders and the perpetrators – either 
did not see or failed to witness, understand.9 The Jews saw but did not understand what they saw, 
the bystanders saw but did not look directly, while the perpetrators saw everything and made 
everything essentially invisible in order not to be seen.  
As Lauď aŶd FelŵaŶ eǆplaiŶs: ͞To ŵake the Jeǁs iŶǀisiďle Ŷot ŵeƌelǇ ďǇ killiŶg theŵ, Ŷot 
ŵeƌelǇ ďǇ ĐoŶfiŶiŶg theŵ to ͚Đaŵouflaged͛, iŶǀisiďle death Đaŵps, ďut ďǇ ƌeduĐiŶg eǀeŶ the 
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materiality of the dead bodies to smoke and ashes, and by reducing, furthermore, the radical opacity 
of the sight of the dead bodies, as well as the linguistic referentiality and literality of the word 
͚Đoƌpse͛ to the tƌaŶspaƌeŶĐǇ of a puƌe foƌŵ aŶd to the puƌe ƌhetoƌiĐal ŵetaphoƌiĐitǇ of a ŵeƌe figuƌe: 
a disembodied verbal substitute which signifies abstractly the linguistic law of infinite exchangeability 
and substitutability. The dead bodies are thus verbally rendered invisible, and voided both of 
substance and specificity, by being treated, in the Nazi jargon, as Figuren: that which, all at once, 
cannot be seen and can be seen through.͟10 Without the possibility of seeing, or as a result of that 
͚seeiŶg͛ aŶd ͚uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg͛ ǁeƌe dƌifted apaƌt11, Laub claims the impossibility of bearing witness 
͚fƌoŵ iŶside͛ due to the absolute dehumanizing and destructive power of the Nazi regime which did 
Ŷot offeƌ aŶǇ fƌaŵe of ƌefeƌeŶĐe to step outside aŶd uŶdeƌstaŶd ǁhat is happeŶiŶg oŶ the ͞plaŶet of 
AusĐhǁitz͟12.  Thus, for the dehumanized creature the result of both the impossibility of escaping 
fƌoŵ the ͞iŶside͟ aŶd the laĐk of atteŶtioŶ, ƌeĐogŶitioŶ oŶ ďehalf of the outside ;ďǇstaŶdeƌs oƌ the 
outside ǁoƌld ǁho oǀeƌlooked oƌ failed to seeͿ ͞eǆtiŶguished [philosophiĐallǇ] the ǀeƌǇ possiďilitǇ of 
address, the possibility of appealiŶg, oƌ of tuƌŶiŶg to, aŶotheƌ͟13, hence to bear witness. This creates 
for the Holocaust a paradoxical situation in history claiming that it is an absolute historical event 
͞ǁhose liteƌallǇ oǀeƌǁhelŵiŶg eǀideŶĐe ŵakes it iŶto aŶ utteƌlǇ pƌoofless eǀeŶt͟14.  
In his book, Remnants of Auschwitz15 Giorgio Agamben develops a very similar argument on 
the ͞autheŶtiĐ͟ oƌ ͞ƌeal͟ ǁitŶess. He poiŶts out the paƌadoǆ iŶ ǁitŶessiŶg eŵphasiziŶg that those 
ǁho saǁ the ͞fatal seĐƌet͟16, in other words, witnessed the creŵatoƌiuŵ ͞fƌoŵ iŶside͟ aƌe dead, 
however they are the real witnesses of Auschwitz.17 The suƌǀiǀoƌ͛s testiŵoŶǇ is Ŷeitheƌ autheŶtiĐ, Ŷoƌ 
Đoŵplete ďut oŶlǇ ŵediated siŶĐe ͞testiŵoŶǇ ĐoŶtaiŶs a laĐuŶa ;…Ϳ aŶd the ǀalue of testiŵoŶǇ lies 
essentially in what it lacks; at its centre it contains something that cannot be borne witness to and 
that disĐhaƌges the suƌǀiǀoƌs ǁith authoƌitǇ.͟18 Agamben then however claims that on the basis of 
the ͞iŵpossiďilitǇ of speakiŶg͟19 theƌe is a ͚possiďilitǇ of testiŵoŶǇ to ďeaƌ ǁitŶess͛. IŶ the Đase of the 
MuselŵaŶŶ, the figuƌe oŶ the thƌeshold ďetǁeeŶ life aŶd dead, ͞theƌe ĐaŶ ďe testiŵoŶǇ ďeĐause 
there is an inseparable division and non-coincidence between inhuman and human, the living being 
and the speaking being, the Muselmann aŶd the suƌǀiǀoƌ͟20. The Muselmanner, according to 
AgaŵďeŶ͛s iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ ǁhiĐh is pƌiŵaƌilǇ ďased oŶ Pƌiŵo Leǀi͛s uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg21, are the remnants 
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of Auschwitz, hence the true witnesses of the camp which cannot speak and whose testimonies are 
mediated by the ͞iŶĐoŵplete͟ suƌǀiǀoƌs. 
 IŶ AgaŵďeŶ͛s ǁoƌk theƌe is Ŷot ŵuĐh aďout seeiŶg ďut iŶstead, he shifts the eŵphasis fƌoŵ 
the aƌt of seeiŶg to the aĐt of speakiŶg that appeaƌs as a ͞test͟ of ďeiŶg oƌ ƌeŵaiŶiŶg huŵaŶ. 
Speaking is a triumph in a sense that the human overcomes the inhuman by appropriating language 
ǁith the usage of liŶguistiĐ sigŶs, suĐh as ͚I͛ aŶd ͚Ǉou͛.22 Laub introduces the very same idea by filling 
the gap of ͚Ǉou͛ ǁith the ƌole of the ͞ƌespoŶsiǀe͟, ͞atteŶtiǀe͟ aŶd ͞uŶoďtƌusiǀelǇ pƌeseŶt͟23 of the 
listeŶeƌ that is the psǇĐhoaŶalǇst. The ŶeĐessitǇ of a ͚Ǉou͛ to eŶaďle the ǀiĐtiŵ to oǀeƌĐoŵe the 
tƌauŵatiĐ ŵuteŶess, to speak as ǁell as to ƌestoƌe the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s huŵaŶitǇ is, as Lauď aƌgues, ͞aŶotheƌ 
ŵode of stƌuggle agaiŶst the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s eŶtƌapŵeŶt iŶ trauma repetition, against their enslavement to 
the fate of theiƌ ǀiĐtiŵizatioŶ.͟24 Since victims of traumatic events fail to integrate past experiences 
iŶto theiƌ ŵeŵoƌies ǁhiĐh, ĐoŶseƋueŶtlǇ, ĐoŶtiŶue to ͞hauŶt͟ theŵ iŶ the pƌeseŶt, the pƌeseŶt 
becomes for the victims nothing else but the persistent re-living of the past. Laub claims that the 
therapeutic conditions – identifying the analyst as a listener who carefully, and with empathy, follows 
the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s ŶaƌƌatioŶ aŶd ŵight as ǁell ďeĐoŵe a paƌtŶeƌ iŶ this ͚jouƌŶeǇ͛ – have a healing effect and 
might bring about the possibility of rescuing traumatic past experiences being entrapped in the 
pƌeseŶt. The aĐt of speakiŶg iŶ theƌapǇ, heŶĐe the ŶaƌƌatioŶ of oŶe͛s life histoƌǇ uŶdeƌ ͚steƌile͛ 
circumstances, whose life ďoƌe ǁitŶess to a tƌauŵa, ŵight help ƌeĐoŶstƌuĐt histoƌǇ aŶd ͞ƌe-
eǆteƌŶalize͟ the eǀeŶt, iŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, ͚eŵplot͛ oŶe͛s oǁŶ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe iŶto a ĐoheƌeŶt stoƌǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh 
traumatic disruptions become integral, nonetheless formative experiences of the past.25 
Regarding the historical validity of the testimony Laub confronts with the historians and 
suggests that despite histoƌiĐal iŶaĐĐuƌaĐies oŶe͛s peƌsoŶal aĐĐouŶt oŶ the past pƌoǀides a ŵoƌe 
nuanced, additional knowledge. To support his argument, his well-known example is taken from the 
FoƌtuŶoff Video AƌĐhiǀe foƌ HoloĐaust TestiŵoŶies ǁhiĐh he lauŶĐhed iŶ ϭϵϳϵ at Yale UŶiǀeƌsitǇ͛s 
DepaƌtŵeŶt of MaŶusĐƌipts aŶd AƌĐhiǀes, aŶd ǁhiĐh is Ŷoǁ ͞a ĐolleĐtioŶ of oǀeƌ ϰ.ϰϬϬ ǀideotaped 
interviews with witnesses and suƌǀiǀoƌs of the HoloĐaust͟26. Lauď Đites a ǁoŵaŶ͛s testiŵoŶǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh 
she talks about being witnessed to a failed attempt to resists the Nazis in Auschwitz in October, 
ϭϵϰϰ: ͞All of a suddeŶ, ǁe saǁ fouƌ ĐhiŵŶeǇs goiŶg up iŶ flaŵes, eǆplodiŶg. The flaŵes shot into the 
skǇ, people ǁeƌe ƌuŶŶiŶg. It ǁas uŶďelieǀaďle.͟27 While historians discredited her testimony due to 
her limited knowledge on the fact that only one chimney blew up in Auschwitz during the uprising of 
the ͚CaŶada CoŵŵaŶdo͛ iŶ the eŶd of ϭϵϰϰ, Laub unfolded a different kind of truth28 in her narration 
saǇiŶg that ͞[T]he ǁoŵaŶ ǁas testifǇiŶg, Ŷot to the uŵďeƌ of the ĐhiŵŶeǇ ďloǁŶ up, ďut to 
something else, more radical, more crucial: the reality of an unimaginable occurrence. One chimney 
blown up in Auschwitz was as incredible as four. The number mattered less than the fact of the 
occurrence. The event itself was almost inconceivable. The woman testified to an event that broke 
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the all compelling frame of Auschwitz, where Jewish armed revolts just did not happen, and had no 
plaĐe. “he testified to the ďƌeakage of a fƌaŵeǁoƌk. That ǁas histoƌiĐal tƌuth.͟29 
Lauď͛s appƌoaĐh to suƌǀiǀoƌ testiŵoŶies ǁas Ŷot paƌadigŵatiĐ ďut iŶstead ǁas a 
ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe eǆaŵple of ͞the eƌa of the ǁitŶess͟30, as Wieviorka names the time period from the 
eŶd of the ϭϵϳϬs. TheŶ a ͚fƌeŶzǇ͛ staƌted foƌ life stoƌies ǁhiĐh oŶ the oŶe haŶd ǁeƌe staŶdaƌdized 
along the line of moral and political responsibility, on the other, rendered exclusive significance to 
the victims and their testimonies. Hence the legitimate speaker of a true and authentic account on 
the past, which was once the eyewitness, now became the traumatized victim.31 By the same token 
the status of ǁitŶessiŶg ǁas ͞delegated͟32 to the listener, let it be the psychoanalyst, the interviewer 
oƌ the histoƌiaŶ ǁho ͞fƌoŵ outside͟ iŶteƌpƌeted ǁhat ǁas told aŶd ͚testified͛ foƌ the past.33 
 Without diminishing the benefits of psychoanalytic reconstruction of traumatic past 
experiences I would argue that the shifting emphasis34 from the role of the eyewitness to the 
positioŶ of the ǀiĐtiŵ has aŶ effeĐt Ŷot oŶlǇ oŶ the ǁitŶess ďut also oŶ the ͚eǇe͛, ŵoƌe pƌeĐiselǇ aŶd 
literally, it takes the credit from it. And here I do not mean to play an arbitrary game with the words. 
The Holocaust, as Lauď aƌgues ǁas aŶ ͞uŶiŵagiŶaďle oĐĐuƌƌeŶĐe͟, that is to saǇ that it ǁas a set of 
events which cannot be framed in images, which cannot be visualized in a true and authentic way, 
hence it cannot be known and remembered properly.35 Thus positioŶiŶg the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s, instead of the 
eǇeǁitŶess͛, testiŵoŶǇ, as a pƌiǀileged foƌŵ of ŵeŵoƌǇ, deŶotes a shift fƌoŵ iŵagiŶatioŶ, oƌ 
iŵagiŶatiǀe ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ to the histoƌiĐal. It depƌiǀes ͚seeiŶg͛ fƌoŵ ͚tƌuth͛, ͚autheŶtiĐitǇ͛ oƌ 
͚ageŶĐǇ͛ aŶd ĐoŶsideƌs ͚the eǇe͛ oŶlǇ as a ǀehicle of language and gestures to formulate historical 
knowledge.  
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What is happening is that the eye is distinguished from vision, since under the pressure of 
traumatic experiences, as we have seen the case of the woman and the four chimneys, it often leads 
to ͞false͟, ͞iŶautheŶtiĐ͟ ǁitŶessiŶg36. Thus testimony becomes the representation of the traumas of 
the HoloĐaust, the ŶoŶfiĐtioŶal geŶƌe ǁhiĐh is ĐoŶsideƌed as ͞histoƌiĐal tƌuth͟, aŶd fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, as 
Dominick LaCapra argues, in cases it is equated with history.37 LaCapra does not diminish the 
iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of testiŵoŶǇ ǁhiĐh is ͞ĐƌuĐial as a ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh aŶ iŶtiŵidated oƌ otheƌǁise ǁithdƌaǁŶ 
victim of trauma may overcome being overwhelmed by numbness and passivity, reengage in social 
pƌaĐtiĐe, aŶd aĐƋuiƌe a ǀoiĐe͟38 but warns us not to equate testimony with history, neither agency 
with witnessing39.  
  IŶ this Đhapteƌ I folloǁ LaCapƌa͛s adŵoŶitioŶ aŶd eǆploƌe the ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ tƌauŵa 
and representation in order to provide a theoretical framework for my further analysis. First I 
attempt to understand the concept of trauma starting from a rather psychoanalytic perspective and 
then shifting towards historiography. Then I aim to conceptualize the Holocaust as a traumatic event 
within the context of representation and think about the ways in which the experience of the 
Holocaust was understood, thought, reflected or visualized in art. I argue that art, or representation 
iŶ geŶeƌal, is aŶ ͞outeƌ diŵeŶsioŶ of ŵeŵoƌǇ͟; a tool foƌ the ǁoƌkiŶg-through of a trauma; a 
possibility for a new rhetoric that provides a better understanding of our past, present and our 
future.  
 
 
Trauma and representation 
 
Cathy Caruth begins with the story of Clorinda and Tancred in her book on trauma theory.40The 
Italian romantic poet, Torquato Tasso published in 1581 his epic titled Jerusalem Delivered, which is a 
story about the First Crusade and how the Christian knights battle against the Muslims and try to win 
back Jerusalem from them. Tancred, a Christian knight falls in love with Clorinda a warrior-maiden 
who is on the side of the Muslims. After Clorinda set the Christian siege tower into fire they come 
across each other behind the veil of night. Since both of them are in armour they fail to recognize (do 
not see) each other and start a fight in which Tancred kills Clorinda by mistake. In her last will the 
dying woman asks the knight to baptize her. Tancred removes the helmet and identifies under it his 
love. Following the burial Tancred rushes into a forest, grabs his sword and slashes it at a tƌee; ͞ďut 
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blood streams from the cut and the voice of Clorinda, whose soul is imprisoned in the tree, is heard 
ĐoŵplaiŶiŶg that he has ǁouŶded his ďeloǀed oŶĐe agaiŶ.͟41 – writes Tasso, quoted by Cathy Caruth, 
literary theorist, in her book Unclaimed Experience. Caruth opens her book and begins to think about 
tƌauŵa ǁith TaŶĐƌed͛s stoƌǇ aŶd folloǁs Fƌeud͛s iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ ǁhiĐh plaĐes ƌepetitioŶ – that is the 
repeated infliction of pain on Clorinda – iŶ the heaƌt of tƌauŵa. Hoǁeǀeƌ Caƌuth͛s aŶalǇsis dƌaǁs 
attention not only to the traumatic experience and its unwished-for repetition but also to the 
phenomenon of the voice. Caruth argues that the traumatic event, when he killed his love by chance, 
happened too unexpectedly and too painfully for him that he could not integrate it into his past, 
hence Tancred becomes aware of his deed only the second wounding, in the forest.  
As a ŵatteƌ of the delaǇed uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of ͚ǁhat happeŶed͛ Caƌuth͛s keǇ ĐoŶĐepts aƌe 
͞ďelatedŶess͟ aŶd ͞iŶaĐĐessiďilitǇ͟ suggestiŶg that traumatic events resist immediate 
comprehension42, are always followed by latency aŶd theŶ the ͞ǀoiĐe Đƌied out of the ǁouŶd͟. The 
latteƌ ŵeaŶs that the ǀiĐtiŵ of tƌauŵa ĐaŶŶot pƌoĐess, ƌepƌeseŶt the eǀeŶt ďut ͞peƌfoƌŵs͟, ƌe-
experience it in the flashback that repeats the trauma in its literalness and immediacy. She supports 
her argument on unrepresentability with ideas taken from neuroscience, drawing on the American 
phǇsiĐiaŶ Bessel ǀaŶ deƌ Kolk͛s43 theory. Van der Kolk argues that the traumatic event is registered in 
the brain at its occurrence and then it later becomes and image on the right side of the brain which 
resists to symbolization, representation. It cannot be read only belatedly not because of repression 
but because it is dissociated from the language centres on the left. Hence due to the temporary 
malfunctioning of consciousness and memory, instead of representation, the literal coding of the 
event takes place – the iŵage gets iŵpƌiŶted iŶto oŶe͛s ŵiŶd liteƌallǇ, ǁhiĐh is ďǇ ŶeuƌosĐieŶtifiĐ 
definitioŶ, uŶƌepƌeseŶtaďle ďut ǁhiĐh Đoŵes ďaĐk aŶd ͞hauŶts͟ the ǀiĐtiŵ ǀia ͚flashďaĐks͛. 
FlashďaĐks ͟suggest that [tƌauŵa] ĐaŶŶot ďe thought siŵplǇ as a ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ͟, it is peƌĐeiǀed ďǇ 
Caƌuth as ͞a ͚ǁalkiŶg͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ a ͚seeiŶg͛͟ 44 . Traumatic experience stands outside of 
representation and since its transmission happens mimetically to the next generation the best it can 
be approached as a performative act of language, of voice. 
 Historian and trauma theorist Dominick LaCapra however discounts the deconstructive 
ƌeadiŶg of Caƌuth͛s tƌauŵa theoƌǇ ǁhiĐh saǇs that tƌauŵa, as LaCapƌa aƌgues ͞ĐaŶ oŶlǇ ďe 
represented or addressed indirectly in figurative or allegorical terms that necessarily distort or betray 
it͟45. In the meanwhile LaCapra works on a set of criteria in order to conceptualize and evaluate the 
relationship between history and psychoanalysis avoiding the concepts such as deconstruction, 
pathologization or redemption but linking the inquiry to ethical-political concerns. He makes a 
distinction between historical and structural trauma – which is considered by both Laub and Caruth 
as reciprocal – and means by structural geŶeƌal ͞aŶǆietǇ-pƌoduĐiŶg͟ ĐoŶditioŶs of humanity like 
mortality, while historical trauma is a historically and morally specific punctual events, such as the 
Holocaust. Historical trauma causes a rupture in memory, LaCapra calls it primary memory, thus the 
traumatic experience fails to integrate into the past and be directly remembered. Due to the lack of 
understanding on what happened the only tool the victim has is to relive, re-experience the event, 
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and later as a result of a critical work on primary memory, with the help of secondary memory, the 
event can be worked-thƌough aŶd iŶseƌted iŶto oŶe͛s life stoƌǇ.  
As a matter of fact there could be three possible reaction given to trauma.46 There is the 
strategy of denial, mostly applied in the case of redemptive narrative, in which the victim excludes 
tƌauŵa aŶd aiŵs to aǀoid aŶ ͞eǆpliĐit eŶĐouŶteƌ ǁith Ŷoƌŵatiǀe pƌoďleŵs aŶd to ƌestƌiĐt historical 
disĐouƌse to seeŵiŶglǇ eŵpiƌiĐal aŶd aŶalǇtiĐal uses of laŶguage͟47. The other two strategies focus 
on understanding the ways in which one remembers the traumatic event: LaCapra borrows the 
ĐoŶĐepts of ͚ǁoƌkiŶg-thƌough͛ aŶd ͚aĐtiŶg-out͛ fƌoŵ psǇĐhoaŶalǇsis aŶd ŵakes theŵ ƌeadaďle foƌ 
historical studies. In the aftermath of the traumatic event there is melancholia that is an isolating 
experience in whiĐh the tƌauŵatized self is loĐked iŶ aŶd ƌeŵaiŶs ͞ŶaƌĐissistiĐallǇ ideŶtified ǁith the 
lost oďjeĐt͟.  
More precisely, LaCapra differentiates between loss and absence and relates absence – ͞a 
mimetic relation to the past which is relived as if it was fully pƌeseŶt͟ ǁhiĐh ŵeaŶs to ĐoŶsideƌ the 
past as if it was fully present – to the state of acting-out.48 Acting-out is a necessary precondition of 
processing and dealing with the past for those who underwent trauma. It is related to repetition or 
to repetitive-compulsion which means the repetitive reliving or re-experiencing past occurrences 
ǁhiĐh ŵight appeaƌ iŶ ͚flashďaĐks͛, as Caƌuth disĐussed it eaƌlieƌ. AĐtiŶg-out might be countervailed 
by the force of working-through, however, as all binary oppositions are discouraged so is the relation 
ďetǁeeŶ the tǁo defiŶed as iŶ Đlose pƌoǆiŵitǇ ǁith eaĐh otheƌ: ͞theǇ aƌe iŶtiŵatelǇ paƌts of a 
pƌoĐess͟49, eǆplaiŶs LaCapƌa iŶ aŶ iŶteƌǀieǁ. MelaŶĐholia ĐaŶ ďe folloǁed ďǇ ŵouƌŶiŶg, ͞ǁheƌe gƌief 
is repeated in reduced, normatiǀelǇ ĐoŶtƌolled aŶd soĐiallǇ suppoƌted foƌŵ͟50. Working through 
conveys the possibility to engage in trauma, hence the victim aims to take a critically distance on the 
problems; to recognize the difference between past and present and to deprive past experiences 
from the dominating the present. Achieving a distance and setting oneself free from the tendency to 
be fixated on the past as well as to be drawn back by flashbacks and nightmares implies the process 
of ƌeŶeǁiŶg oŶe͛s life iŶ the pƌeseŶt aŶd fiŶd harmony, hence the ability to reconstitute agency.  
However, as Gábor Gyáni, historian, notes LaCapra does not imply that working-through can 
be fully accomplished and it might not be a desired achievement for neither the survivors, nor their 
descendants. Otherwise such a detachment from a past experience would distort the meaning of the 
past, regard it as complete, total, banal or harmonic.51 Additionally, not only the individual but also 
the community has responsibility and work to do via social practices an rituals which generate 
Ŷoƌŵatiǀe liŵits iŶ oƌdeƌ to, as EƌiĐ “aŶtŶeƌ ǁƌites Ŷot to ͞eǆpuŶge the tƌaĐes of tƌauŵa͟52, but to 
iŶtegƌate iŶto oŶe͛s life stoƌǇ. FolloǁiŶg GǇáŶi͛s liŶe of thiŶkiŶg ǁhat is iŶteƌestiŶg heƌe is that it 
seems like even though LaCapra and the others are engaged in challenging the concept of trauma, 
memory-compulsion still celebrates its victory over working-through. Hence trauma is inflicted upon 
the concept of working-through as if it was worth preserving at all costs. What strikes me in this is 
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the question whether there is any kind of meaning of trauma which could be distorted in the process 
of working through? What happens with the trauma when it enters the sphere of memory-work? 
How can this transformation be grasped? What is gained and what is lost in this translation? I argue 
that one among the dynamic social spaces in which grief- and memory-work can be effectively 
practiced is: art. Further, the history of the Holocaust representations provides a perspective which 
might tell us more about the trauma, about its changing significance and its traces in memory, if at 
all.  
In order to understand the role of art in relation to trauma I would suggest to go back to 
LaCapra. He argues back in 1994 that the Holocaust itself is an already canonized historical event that 
is to say that there exists an already established knowledge which fuels as well as creates a frame of 
reference for historical and imaginative discourses.53 Canonization, in this respect especially, covers 
all the wounds and pains the event might have been caused and creates an impression that nothing 
subversive or disturbing happened. However LaCapra proposes to the historians to re-think some of 
the texts that are chosen to be canonized as well as those which were marginalized in order to 
challenge the well-established knowledge on the past as well as engage in a critical dialogue with the 
pƌeseŶt. A teǆt is oŶlǇ ĐoŶsideƌed as histoƌiĐal if it has a ͞Ŷeǀeƌ-to-be-fixated limit of 
ĐoŶteǆtualizatioŶ͟54. Re-contextualization shall not be considered as the production of simple 
replicas or derivative items but as the creation of necessary, valuable reflections. Reflections fuel a 
critical work on the past in order to re-enact and not to repeat it as well as to open towards the 
future and engage in new imaginative and historical possibilities. Amy Hungerford in her book 
eŶtitled the ͚The HoloĐaust of Teǆts͛ hoǁeǀeƌ ǀeheŵeŶtlǇ opposes the possiďilitǇ to ƌethiŶk teǆts aŶd 
ĐhaŶŶel oƌ tƌaŶsŵissioŶ theiƌ ͚Ŷeǁ͛ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶgs iŶto iŵagiŶative and historical representations. 
She is especially against the personification of the Holocaust and regards it as an arbitrary game of 
the ͞faŶtasǇ that ǁe ĐaŶ ƌeallǇ haǀe aŶotheƌ͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe, that ǁe ĐaŶ ďeĐoŵe soŵeoŶe else͟55. 
Similarly, Gary WeissmaŶ ideŶtifies the iŶstitutioŶalizatioŶ of the HoloĐaust iŶ the ͞faŶtasǇ of 
ǁitŶessiŶg͟56. Both of them claim that one shall establish an objective and nonsentimental 
relationship towards the Holocaust which sets aside transfiguration or any kind of artistic and literary 
representation. Gabriele Schwab on the other hand dwells into linguistics and argues that symbolism 
or anthropomorphism is a basic operation of language, all the more transfiguration - personalization 
or anthropomorphic representation – is necessary in order to empathize as well as emotionally relate 
to the other person, hence to get engaged in the working-through process.57 As a matter of fact, art, 
as LaCapra argues, is considered – siŵilaƌlǇ to the histoƌiaŶs͛ ǁoƌk of ƌe-thinking canons – as a 
possiďle tool to estaďlish a stiŵulatiŶg ƌelatioŶ to the past ͞to ďuild a ƌelatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ŵeŵoƌǇ aŶd 
ƌeĐoŶstƌuĐtioŶ that keep oŶ seŶsitiǀe to the pƌoďleŵatiĐ of tƌauŵa͟58.  
Similar consequence is drawn by the historian Saul Friedlander. His starting point is a 
diffeƌeŶtiatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ͚deep ŵeŵoƌǇ͛ aŶd ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ ŵeŵoƌǇ͛, tǁo teƌŵs takeŶ fƌoŵ Chaƌlette 
Delbo.59 Deep memory is meant to be an event which remains an unsettled trauma and can hardly be 
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iŶtegƌated iŶto oŶe͛s past, ǁhile ĐoŵŵoŶ ŵeŵoƌǇ takes its plaĐe in the chronology of events. 
FƌiedlaŶdeƌ͛s ĐhalleŶge is to estaďlish a histoƌiogƌaphǇ ǁhiĐh peƌŵits the iŶtegƌatioŶ of ďoth tǇpes of 
memories in the historical narrative. He requires the self awareness of the historian, in the form of 
the commentary, which ͞should disƌupt the faĐile liŶeaƌ pƌogƌessioŶ of the ŶaƌƌatioŶ, iŶtƌoduĐe 
alteƌŶatiǀe iŶteƌpƌetatioŶs, ƋuestioŶ aŶǇ paƌtial ĐoŶĐlusioŶ, ǁithstaŶd the Ŷeed foƌ Đlosuƌe͟60. He 
calls it as the working-through process of the historians who deal with the traumatic past. The 
process is primarily an imperative to work not only with documents, facts and figure but also with 
testimonies and personal accounts and secondarily working-through means an awareness to find a 
fƌagile ďalaŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ sileŶĐe aŶd ͞disƌuptiǀe eŵotioŶs͟61, that is to say to avoid on the one hand 
full objectivity and neutrality and on the other hand a full identification with the victims which might 
tƌaŶsfoƌŵ the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ iŶto a ͞suƌƌogate ǀiĐtiŵ͟62.  
This problematic balance brings up the question of transference that is in the psychoanalytic 
sense repetition, however when it comes to the role of the listener, researcher or of the historian it 
refers to a respectful and emphatic subject-position in relation to the victim.63 Hence the challenge 
for the historian is not to avoid engaging in a (possibly emotional) dialog with the victims nonetheless 
– this would deny the possibility of positivism – and to articulate or reconstruct, without the hint of 
closure, a valid understanding of the past.  
I would argue that the integration of deep memory into historiography invokes in 
FƌiedlaŶdeƌ͛s ǁoƌk the Ŷeed to thiŶk aďout the ƌelatioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ŵeŵoƌǇ, histoƌǇ aŶd ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ 
in the context of the Holocaust. He questions the literary representation which was born following 
the First World War, lived on after the Second World War – this also suggests that there was no 
adequate artistic or literary response to the Second World War – and has an ironic aesthetics, since 
the emerging literature (for example Aharon Appelfeld, Primo Levi, Tadeusz Borowksi) could not 
speak ǁith the saŵe ǀoiĐe ďut aspiƌed to tell theiƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐes iŶ a ͞pƌofouŶdlǇ didaĐtiĐ ǁaǇ͟64. He 
ďelieǀes that the iƌoŶiĐ ŵode uŶdeƌŵiŶe all the ŵeaŶiŶgs aŶd ͞Đƌeates a ŵajoƌ oďstaĐle to the 
represeŶtatioŶ of the “hoah͟65 as ǁell as ͞aĐĐeŶtuate the dileŵŵas͟66. Friedlander cries for a new 
aesthetics which respects remembering-compulsion and avoids the transgression of meanings. He 
might also suggest that the representation of the Holocaust on the basis of ͞the Ŷeǁ aesthetiĐs͟ 
would powerfully and effectively contribute to collectively deal with the trauma. Hence it would 
pƌoǀide a solid fƌaŵe of ƌefeƌeŶĐe foƌ the ͞ĐolleĐtiǀe self-perception of the groups directly 
iŶǀolǀed͟67 as well as play a primary role in the elaboration of historical consciousness.68 
FƌiedlaŶdeƌ͛s aƌguŵeŶtatioŶ ďƌiŶgs up the ƋuestioŶ of hoǁ it is possiďle to eǆpeƌieŶĐe aŶ 
event collectively, or create a sense of collectivity? How can a traumatic event experienced if it was 
never experienced directly? As it was discussed above, from the 1970s the personal trauma went 
into public en masse and testimonies, more precisely the voice of the traumatized victim started 
dominating the discourse on the Holocaust contributing to the creation of a globalized space of 
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Holocaust memory.69 That is to saǇ that the HoloĐaust ďeĐoŵes a ͞defiŶitiǀe Đatastƌophe͟70 which 
bridges over national or ethnic lines and represents the universal Evil, a reference point to all other 
traumatic historical occurrences.  
Jeffrey C. Alexander71 argues likewise and explores those socio-historical processes through 
which the Holocaust became detached from a particular historical event and became a central and 
universal tragedy of humanity in modern times.72 However Alexander explains the shift from 
regarding the Holocaust as one of the atrocities of the Second World War to a full identification with 
the tƌauŵatiĐ eǀeŶt ďǇ iŶtƌoduĐiŶg tǁo foƌŵs of thiŶkiŶg. The fiƌst is, as he Đalls is, the ͚LaǇ Tƌauŵa 
Theory͛ ǁhiĐh Đlaiŵs that tƌauŵa is ŶatuƌallǇ paƌt of huŵaŶs͛ liǀes aŶd tƌauŵatisatioŶ is aŶ 
autoŵatiĐ ƌeaĐtioŶ to it. IŶ the seĐoŶd theoƌǇ, Đalled ͚Cultuƌal Tƌauŵa͛, tƌauŵa is ĐoŶĐeiǀed as a 
socially constructed phenomenon that is epistemological, hence is not an ontologically given but 
something that has to become traumatic. It becomes traumatic when there is a gap between the 
events and its representation, but it only gains social significance and becomes a collective state of 
affairs belatedly and requires agents, mediations and a community of carriers and caretakers. The 
gap is not always open to interpretation and agency, sometimes it demands decades to achieve 
appƌopƌiatioŶ, fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, as FeƌeŶĐ Eƌős, psǇĐhologist, Ŷotes, it ŵight tƌiggeƌ a gƌeat outďuƌst of 
hostility from the outside and puts a burden not only on the relatives and on those who are directly 
affected but also on the following generations73. As it was in the case of the Holocaust which was in 
the ďegiŶŶiŶg a ͞ǁaƌ dƌaŵa͟, theŶ alƌeadǇ at the Nurnberg trial its generalization started, followed 
by the establishment of a legal framework as to never let it happen again, then came the 1960s and 
the EiĐhŵaŶŶ tƌial ǁheŶ ǀiĐtiŵs Đaŵe iŶto the liŵelight aŶ lateƌ fƌoŵ the ϭϵϴϬs it ͞estaďlished the 
basis foƌ ŵetoŶǇŵiĐ Ƌuilt͟, ďeĐaŵe aŶ aŶalogǇ foƌ disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ aŶd pƌoǀided a ǀoĐaďulaƌǇ foƌ the 
framework of universal human rights. In sum Alexander argues that the collective and universal 
trauma of the Holocaust is a result of two parallel procedures: one the one hand of the construction 
of the community of victims as well as by the emotional identification of either with them or with the 
perpetrators, on the other hand of the symbolic extension of the event which stimulated an 
unprecedented universalizatioŶ of ŵoƌal aŶd politiĐal ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ ;as the ͚Ŷeǀeƌ agaiŶ!͛ ŵoƌal 
imperative suggests).   
Alexander argues that trauma is mediated through representation which generates some 
kind of knowledge as well as identification towards the event. The mediated power of representation 
does not only function in the first stages of cultural trauma but also when the trauma-situation 
stands still and when the meanings get materialized in museums, monuments. In this part of the 
chapter I attempted to explore trauma as an object of memory studies as well as to understand the 
ways in which trauma theories approach the question of representation.  
Considering the pervious theories on trauma, through the lens of Alexander they all belong 
to the so-Đalled ͚laǇ tƌauŵa theoƌǇ͛. Indeed, both by Caruth and LaCapra trauma, as the mental 
consequence of an act of violence, was theorized as a self-evident and automatic reaction of a 
human being. Alexander argues on the other hand that it cannot be read as a fixed and positivist 
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affirmation of a violent situation but it is produced, belatedly through the course of time. Trauma can 
ďe uŶdeƌstood as a ͞ŵoƌal poďleŵatizatioŶ͟74 ǁhiĐh ͞pƌopose Ŷoǁ fƌaŵeǁoƌks to iŶteƌpƌet ;...Ϳ 
conflicts (...) [and] is not only a clinical description of a psychological status but also a political 
eǆpƌessioŶ of a state of the ǁoƌld͟.75 Trauma is political because it has both individual and collective 
importance in positioning ourselves and let ourselves be positioned in the narrative of the past. 
However I find iŵpoƌtaŶt LaCapƌa͛s ĐoŶĐept of ǁoƌkiŶg-through since it offers a practical approach 
to Đoŵe to teƌŵ ǁith the past as ǁell as suggests to Đlose the gap ǁhiĐh, iŶ AleǆaŶdeƌ͛s 
interpretation, is between the event and its immediate representation. In the following I will 
introduce the dilemma of representation in the context of the Holocaust.  
 
 
Representation and the experience of the Holocaust 
 
Literature dealing with the problematic relation between the Holocaust and its representation tend 
to start with the ;iŶͿfaŵous stateŵeŶt of Theodoƌ AdoƌŶo saǇiŶg that ͞afteƌ AusĐhǁitz it is ďaƌďaƌiĐ 
to ĐoŶtiŶue ǁƌitiŶg poetƌǇ͟76. Questions regarding aesthetics or ethics have been raised and up until 
recently we could witness one of the biggest polemical debate of our times.  His antipathy towards 
art provided the dominant theoretical framework to understand the aesthetic regime in the post-
holoĐaust eƌa. As Doƌa Apel eǆplaiŶed aƌt eǆisted afteƌ ϭϵϰϱ iŶdeed hoǁeǀeƌ it ǁas ͚daƌk͛ that is 
realistic without the sense for redemption imagination.77There is the Stojka family, with a special 
emphasis on Karl Stojka who throughout his life, starting immediately after the liberation of Dachau, 
attempted to depict the fate of Roma reflecting on, remembering, re-enacting his experiences under 
the Holocaust.78Zoran Music a Slovenian Jewish survivor of Dachau returned home in Gorizia and 
carried with himself a package of drawings on corpses. He refined and clarified the pictures, then 
took them away and only in 1970 returned to the subject uŶdeƌ the title ͚We aƌe Ŷot last͛. Osias 
Hofstatteƌ͛s ǁoƌk ƌeseŵďles the Đhaos aŶd ǀoid afteƌ AusĐhǁitz ǁhile Yehuda BaĐoŶ, ǁho ǁas 
thirteen at the time he was interned to Theresienstadt, then to Auschwitz, Mauthausen and finally to 
Günskirchen and gave his testimony in the Eichmann trial, started his workbook series in 1973 at the 
time he returned from a sabbatical year in the US to Jerusalem. These workbooks contain his 
memories about the Holocaust.79 However, the art of the non-survivors, let them be of Jewish or 
non-Jewish origin, was also based upon the refusal of aesthetics: Pablo Picasso or Leonard Baskin 
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regarded the Holocaust as a universal tragedy and avoided any Jewish reference80, while Chagall 
applied Christian symbols.81 
 As a matter of fact, as Lawrence Langer82 or Ernst van Alphen83 aƌgues, ͞AdoƌŶo Ŷeǀeƌ 
iŶteŶded his stateŵeŶt to ďe takeŶ liteƌallǇ, as his oǁŶ elaďoƌatioŶs of the pƌiŶĐiple deŵoŶstƌate͟84, 
hence instead of closing down the discussions on artistic representation we shall deprive this 
statement from its assumed authority and reflect upon the issue critically. Indeed, Adorno repeated 
his stateŵeŶt iŶ ϭϵϲϮ saǇiŶg: ͞I d Ŷot ǁaŶt to softeŶ ŵǇ stateŵeŶt that it is ďaƌďaƌiĐ to ĐoŶtiŶue to 
ǁƌite poetƌǇ afteƌ AusĐhǁitz ;…Ϳ It is the situatioŶ of liteƌatuƌe itself aŶd Ŷot siŵplǇ oŶe͛s ƌelatioŶ to 
it that is paƌadoǆiĐal. The aďuŶdaŶĐe of ƌeal suffeƌiŶg peƌŵits Ŷo foƌgettiŶg… But that suffeƌiŶg ;…Ϳ 
also deŵaŶds the ĐoŶtiŶued eǆisteŶĐe of the ǀeƌǇ aƌt it foƌďids͟85. He refused those kinds of works of 
aƌt ǁhiĐh aiŵed at the foƌgettiŶg of the HoloĐaust aŶd ƌedeeŵiŶg the ͚audieŶĐe͛ fƌoŵ the paiŶ, 
trauma or victimhood. Adorno was hostile towards transfiguration, especially towards what Langer 
Đalls ͞liteƌatuƌe of atƌoĐitǇ͟86 ǁhiĐh is aďout ͞the suffeƌiŶg of the victims into works of art, tossed out 
to ďe goďďled up ďǇ the ǁoƌld that did theŵ iŶ͟87. LaŶgeƌ ĐoŶtiŶues ǁith AdoƌŶo͛s ǁoƌds, that ͞The 
so-called artistic representation of naked physical pain of victims felled by rifle butts, contains, 
however remote, the poteŶtialitǇ of ǁƌiŶgiŶg pleasuƌe fƌoŵ it.͟88 The moral consideration behind 
AdoƌŶo͛s hostilitǇ ǁas the ͞iŵpƌopƌietǇ of ͚aesthetiĐ pleasuƌe͛͟89 in the sense of amusement and 
banality as well as the promise of relief, or redemption. Instead, he suggests making art which 
remembers the Holocaust and which works not toward repression or denial but which engages with 
the past and is willing to deal with it.   
 Ernst van Alphen argues in Caught by History that it is pƌiŵaƌilǇ due to AdoƌŶo͛s diĐtuŵ that 
Holocaust representation is morally inadmissible, because it is assumed to cause aesthetic pleasure. 
The statement evokes a complex range of discourses around the Holocaust such as its taboo-status – 
considering it as sacred which would be ethically unacceptable to represent. Jean-Francois Lyotard 
philosopher proclaims, on the basis of the uniqueness and unrepresentability of Auschwitz, the end 
of the era of the meta-narratives. He compares Auschwitz to an earthquake which destroys 
everything including the very reference points by which one is able to formulate judgements: 
͞Suppose that an earthquake destroys not only lives, buildings, and objects but also the instruments 
used to measure earthquakes directly and indirectly. The impossibility of quantitatively measuring it 
does not prohibit, but rather inspires in the minds of the survivors the idea of a very great seismic 
foƌĐe.͟90 Lyotard, similarly to Adorno, considers Auschwitz as an event which cannot be fully known 
however unlike Adorno he destroys all kinds of possibility and knowledge, as the total destruction of 
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the measuring devices by the earthquake suggests. Although scholars would claim that nothing is 
knowable to them about the event, the average people would rather have the feeling of 
indeterminacy and insecurity and they would remain in silence. With this metaphor Lyotard suggests 
that due to the extremity of the event our traditional categories of representation and explanation 
are questioned and language itself becomes insufficient. However as the average men in the 
aftermath of the earthquake are waiting for the historians and scholars to define and explain what 
happened so do we need a solid narration about Auschwitz. Terrence Des Pres is also guided by 
AdoƌŶo͛s diĐtuŵ aŶd suggests that eǆpeƌieŶĐes shall autoŵatiĐallǇ ďe ĐhaŶŶelled iŶto laŶguage 
without the need to mediate them through imagination or culture. And, unavoidably, when it comes 
to representation, then Des Pres sets out the principles for an ethically acceptable form, that is to say 
that the Holocaust shall be represented as a unique event; representation shall be faithful, accurate; 
and the Holocaust shall always be preserved as sacred.91 
Van Alphen however claims that the reason why the historical representation of the 
Holocaust, that is modelled on documentary realist genres such as the testimony or the eye-witness 
aĐĐouŶt, is ƌegaƌded as the ͚pƌopeƌ͛ ŵode of ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ ďeĐause it is ŵiŵetiĐ ;as opposed to the 
imaginative representatioŶ͛s iŶteƌpƌetiǀe appƌoaĐhͿ, tƌue aŶd Ŷot tƌapped iŶ ǀisioŶ͛s ŵiƌage as ǁell 
as re-create the past as its mirrored image, hence untouched, unrepresented. As a matter of fact 
Eƌős eǆplaiŶs that is ŵoƌallǇ iŵpossiďle to ƌepƌeseŶt the HoloĐaust, oŶlǇ its re-presentation, its 
reassertion into the present is allowed.92 Hence one could re-liǀe the past ďǇ ͞the ŵǇsteƌǇ plaǇ of 
ƌeeŶaĐtŵeŶt͟93, that is by retelling the past from the position of the victim. On the other hand, he 
continues, there is the imaginative representation of the event, which is, as they are binary 
oppositions with the historical, also less valuable. It is considered as morally intolerable, inauthentic 
and subjective. Van Alphen suggests replacing the historical and imaginative oppositions into literal 
aŶd figuƌatiǀe. The latteƌ ŵeaŶs that the iŵagiŶatiǀe disĐouƌse is peƌsoŶalized, heŶĐe ͞oŶlǇ figuƌatiǀe 
discourse allows expression of that which is unrepresentable in so-called literal, factual, historical 
laŶguage͟94. Not only believes van Alphen that the figurative/imaginative discourse has an added 
value to our knowledge about the Holocaust as well as it completes what cannot be expressed 
otherwise, but also he argues from a moral point of view saying that the Nazi regime aimed at the 
total destƌuĐtioŶ of the iŶdiǀidual aŶd oŶe͛s peƌsoŶalitǇ thus aƌt shall ƌeĐƌeate suďjeĐtiǀitǇ͛s ǁell-
deserved place in history. Later in his book instead of imaginative representation he introduces the 
teƌŵ ͚HoloĐaust effeĐt͛ as a ŵatteƌ of ƌeeŶaĐtŵeŶt ;diƌeĐt eǆperience via artistic works) and not 
representation.  
The other problem of Holocaust representation, which van Alphen mentions, is semiotic: the 
Holocaust is unsayable and in case of its articulation and have to face with the limits of 
representation. For instance Éva Kovács, sociologist, and Júlia Vajda, psychologist, discussed in their 
book titled Appearance. Jewish Identity Stories95 the Đase ǁheŶ a disƌuptioŶ of ĐoŶtiŶuitǇ iŶ oŶe͛s life 
stoƌǇ, heŶĐe the eǆpeƌieŶĐe of a tƌauŵatiĐ eǀeŶt, ĐhalleŶges oŶe͛s identity as well as deprives from 
both the ability to share it with the others and the possibility of healing. However, van Alphen 
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ĐhaŶges the disĐouƌse oŶ ͞uŶsaǇaďilitǇ͛ ǁith his aƌguŵeŶt iŶ ǁhiĐh he Đlaiŵs that the pƌoďleŵ is 
rather with the available frames of ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ oƌ folloǁiŶg AleǆaŶdeƌ͛s aƌguŵeŶt, theƌe is a gap 
between the event and its existing representations. We first have to experience the event in order to 
formulate, shape our experience through representation however experience is already a 
ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ, it is alƌeadǇ the tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ of the puƌe ͞Ŷaked͟ eǀeŶt iŶto kŶoǁledge.96 
As the true witness of the Holocaust is the Muselmann who cannot speak, according to 
Agamben, it also suggests that there was no form of representation available for the prisoner, such 
as laŶguage, iŶ oƌdeƌ to help theŵ aƌtiĐulate iŶto eǆpeƌieŶĐe ǁhat theǇ ǁeŶt thƌough: ͞this 
unrepresentability defines those events as traumatic. The Holocaust has had a traumatic impact for 
many because it could not be experienced, because a distance form it in language or representation 
ǁas Ŷot possiďle. ;…Ϳ I ǁould aƌgue, iŶ faĐt, that the pƌoďleŵs of the uŶƌepƌeseŶtaďilitǇ of the 
Holocaust arose during the Holocaust itself and not afterward when survivors tried to provide 
testimonies of it, whether literary/artistic or otherwise. To put it differently, the later 
representational problems are a continuation of the impossibility during the event itself to 
experience the Holocaust in the terms of the symbolic order then availaďle͟97. Similarly to Hannah 
Arendt who said that if Auschwitz is unthinkable in juridical or political terms then we must rethink 
and redefine our concept of law and politics.98 HeŶĐe the histoƌiaŶs ͞ŵust Ŷot aĐĐept that the 
problem posed by the genocide of the Jews be neglected by relegating it to the unthinkable. The 
geŶoĐide ǁas thought, it ǁas theƌefoƌe thiŶkaďle.͟99 The genocide was presented, it is therefore 
representable. Only the forms of representation shall be figured out. 
͞The ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of the Holocaust is conditioned by the historical moment in which it is 
pƌoduĐed͟100. That is to say that there is no strict, solid and ever existing mode of representation in 
relation to the Holocaust but the ways in which the Holocaust appears in the historical or imaginative 
discourse is the matter of the ideological, political and cultural circumstances under which 
representation appears. That repetition in this subject matter offers paths to deal with the past 
experience and does not necessarily maintains the very same discourse but challenges the individual 
and collective narrations of the traumatic event. Apel claims that from the mid 1970s a new 
generation of artists appeared on stage to change the agenda.  
The first representatives were Anselm Kiefer or Christian Boltanski. The former was born in 
Germany a few months before the war ended in March 8, 1945. He studies languages first and he 
turned to art, to photography. His first exhibition, called Occupations (Bezetzung) in 1969, for his 
degree was a collection of photographs taken in Switzerland, France and Italy, and on each of those 
Kiefer was standing in front of a famous building and saluting to Hitler.101 As opposed to the 
AŵeƌiĐaŶ aŶd GeƌŵaŶ ĐƌitiĐs ǁhiĐh idealize Kiefeƌ͛s ǁoƌk aŶd pƌaise its ͚GeƌŵaŶŶess͛ AŶdƌeas 
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Huyssen102 claims that his work is not about forgetting the German past but rather bringing it into the 
foƌe aŶd ĐƌitiĐize it. He ƌefuses to hide ďehiŶd ideas suĐh as ͞tƌaŶsĐeŶdeŶtal aƌt͟ aŶd ͞uŶiǀeƌsal 
huŵaŶŶess͟, Ŷeitheƌ ĐoŶsideƌs his ŵǇthiĐal ŵotifs exclusively as a pathway to resurrect the German 
ŶatioŶ, ďut ĐoŶsideƌs ŵǇth aŶd histoƌǇ, iŶ ǀaŶ AlpheŶ͛s ǁoƌds, the iŵagiŶatiǀe aŶd the histoƌiĐal, as 
equally important and mutually explanatory in the context of the past. He evokes the terror the 
Germans committed under the Second World War but also creates spaces of renewal, rebirth. 
Christian Boltanski was born a year earlier than Kiefer, in Paris, France with a mixed Jewish Catholic 
background. He is a self-taught artist who began his career in 1958 and became famous by the end of 
the 1960s. One of his first work which focuses on ideas such as life and death, mourning our memory 
was the Attempt at Reconstitution of Objects that Belonged to Christian Boltanski between 1948 and 
1954 (1970–1971). As vaŶ AlpheŶ Ŷotes iŶ his aŶalǇsis oŶ BoltaŶski, ͞his ĐoŶsisteŶt use of histoƌiĐal 
resources such as the archive reveals the Janus face of the historical approach to the Holocaust. The 
strategy of mimicking archival research is confusing because it does not provide objective 
information about the Holocaust. Instead we are lured into the event itself, experiencing directly a 
certain aspect of Nazism or of the Holocaust as we view an image. We are no longer listening to the 
factual account of the witness, to the story of an objectified past. Rather we are placed in the 
positioŶ of ďeiŶg the suďjeĐt of that histoƌǇ. We aƌe suďjeĐtiǀelǇ liǀiŶg it.͟103 
The historical moment which rendered representation possible was largely shaped by the 
German Historikerstreit (historiaŶs͛ deďateͿ aŶd the histoƌiaŶs͛s, ǁho doŵiŶated aŶd ĐoŶtƌolled 
kŶoǁledge oŶ the HoloĐaust, appƌoaĐh to ͞seeiŶg͟.  The Histoƌikeƌstƌeit ǁas a deďate oǀeƌ 
GeƌŵaŶǇ͛s ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ iŶ the “eĐoŶd Woƌld Waƌ aŶd iŶ the HoloĐaust as ǁell as the Ŷeed to 
historicize the Nazi past. The debate was formative in German national identity which issue emerged 
first time since the war in 1986 by Ernst Nolte who published an article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
)eituŶg ǁith the title ͞The past ǁoŶ͛t go aǁaǇ͟.104 
A few years lateƌ iŶ ϭϵϴϵ a deďate took plaĐe titled ͚HistoƌǇ, EǀeŶt aŶd DisĐouƌse͛ ďetǁeeŶ 
Hayden White and Carlo Ginsburg on the nature of historical truth. White, with extreme relativism, 
aims to lay new foundation to historical understanding by analysing the relation between historical 
storytelling and historical reality. He argues that the choices we make to understand history – i.e. the 
choice of the mode of emplotment or the choice of language – are already interpretations. In that 
sense White denies the possibilitǇ of aŶǇ kiŶd of ͞tƌuth͟ oƌ ͞ƌeal͟ oƌ ͞ŵeta-Ŷaƌƌatiǀe͟ iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt 
of the HoloĐaust: ͞This is Ŷot to suggest that ǁe ǁill giǀe up the effoƌt to ƌepƌeseŶt the HoloĐaust 
realistically, but rather that our notion of what constitutes realistic representation must be revised to 
take account of the experience that are unique to our history and for which older modes of 
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ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ haǀe pƌoǀeŶ iŶadeƋuate.͟105 HeŶĐe he faǀouƌs the ͚ŵodeƌŶist appƌoaĐh͛ aŶd Ŷaŵes 
Primo Levi as one of its representatives. As opposed to White Ginzburg underlines the importance of 
microhistory. He tells the story about a Jewish community in La Baume which was exterminated in 
the ŵid ϭϯϰϬs ǁith oŶlǇ tǁo suƌǀiǀoƌs left. OŶ the ďasis of the stoƌǇ he Đlaiŵs that ͞just oŶe ǁitŶess͟ 
is enough to get an insight in historical reality, hence to get the hint of historical truth.106 His 
insistence on objectivity and historical truth, as Friedlander explains in the Introduction, is very much 
informed by ethical and analytical categories. That is to say that if we deny the voice of the survivor 
as ǁell as ĐoŶsideƌ the FiŶal “olutioŶ iŶ White͛s ƌelatiǀisŵ thaŶ ǁe pƌoǀide the oppoƌtuŶitǇ to the 
counter-history to rise, which might lead to the justification of the Nazi regime. Friedlander 
formulates the Ŷeed foƌ a ͞Ŷeǁ ƌhetoƌiĐal͟ ŵode ǁhiĐh oŶ the oŶe haŶd ƌespeĐts the ƌadiĐalisŵ aŶd 
uniqueness of the event and on the other hand offers the possibility for a hypersensitive 
transgression of the limits of representation.107 
In this historical situation I ǁould ideŶtifǇ thƌee ŵaiŶ ͞shifts͟ ǁhiĐh ĐhaŶged the disĐouƌse oŶ 
Holocaust representation which overwrote the demonization of aesthetics and legitimized the role of 
artistic genres.108 The first one is what James E. Young calls mediation that is a shift from 
ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ to the poƌtƌaǇal of the aƌtist͛s hǇpeƌŵediated eǆpeƌieŶĐes. The seĐoŶd oŶe, ǀeƌǇ 
close in meaning to the first one, introduces the Holocaust as not a singular event but as an event 
which is already filtered through various channels of representation such as media, hence can be 
endowed with a variety of cultural, historical and political meanings. The third one is the shift from 
the need of documentation to the need of identification which visibly manifests itself in the field of 
education as Shoshana Felman discusses it. 
To the dilemma of how it is possible to remember an event which one never experienced 
diƌeĐtlǇ, Jaŵes E. YouŶg pƌoǀides the aŶsǁeƌ ǁith the teƌŵ ͞ǀiĐaƌious ŵeŵoƌǇ͟. OŶe shall ǁitŶess 
the emergence of a new post-war generation which has not directly experienced the events under 
the “eĐoŶd Woƌld Waƌ ďut oŶlǇ kŶoǁ theŵ fƌoŵ heaƌsaǇ, listeŶiŶg to the oldeƌ geŶeƌatioŶ͛s stoƌies 
as well as shaped by them. This generation of artist, as Young argues, does not depict or represent 
the eǀeŶt as it ǁas passed oŶ theŵ ďut poƌtƌaǇ the HoloĐaust fƌoŵ a ͞ǀiĐaƌious past͟109, that is a 
distaŶĐe takeŶ fƌoŵ the fiƌst geŶeƌatioŶ͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe, fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, YouŶg Đlaiŵs that theiƌ ǁoƌk is a 
valuable contribution to the understanding of what happened in the past. The common denominator 
of the secondary witnesses is that they deal with and reflect upon the memory that was transmitted 
to theŵ hoǁeǀeƌ theǇ also add to it theiƌ oǁŶ ƌeseaƌĐhes. IŶ YouŶg͛s ǁoƌds, ͞this geŶeƌation of 
artists, writers, architects, and even composers does not attempt to represent events they never 
knew immediately but instead portray their own, necessarily hypermediated experiences of memory. 
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It is a generation no longer willing, or able, to recall the Holocaust separately from the ways it has 
ďeeŶ passed doǁŶ to theŵ.͟110 
Such as Art Speigelman, David Levinthal, Tibor Balogh, Zsolt Vári or Teréz Orsós, these artists 
childhood is overloaded with stories of the Holocaust and they seek to find these memories a proper 
form of representation which does not fall into the trap of melancholy neither repeats the traumas 
of the proceeding generation nor cause disintegration in their life stories. Following the same line of 
thinking Dora Apel highlights that these artists instead of rendering the memory of the Holocaust 
exclusively to the survivors and ascribing one meaning to it, they question conventional aesthetics 
and aim to look at the event as a culturally, socially and politically significant occurrence in the past 
and then attempt to reformulate the meanings attached to it. The question is not whether these 
representations are violations of a single fixed meaning – they are since all representations, as Apel 
argues, are partial, and Auschwitz can never be fully represented – but how they engage in new 
effect of the Holocaust. 
 Indeed, they introduce a new ethic in representation that is their explicit aim to replace 
sacralized pedagogy of the Holocaust with the interplay of various meanings which makes visible as 
well as raise attention to for instance the relationship between race and nation, the presence of 
everyday racism, the underlying mechanisms of capitalism which intensify discrimination. Sacralized 
pedagogǇ is ŵeaŶt to tƌaŶsŵit a ͞Đoŵplete aŶd totallǇ appƌopƌiated kŶoǁledge͟ ǁhiĐh ͞ǁill ďeĐoŵe 
iŶ all seŶse of the ǁoƌd, a ŵasteƌǇ͟111. IŶ this seŶse of the ǁoƌld pedagogǇ is aŶd ͞aĐadeŵiĐ 
disĐouƌse͟112, as Lacan names it, is linear, frontal, hierarchical and all the more tends to control, 
foƌďid aŶd suppƌess. OŶ the ďasis of AdoƌŶo͛s diĐtuŵ aŶd TeƌƌeŶĐe Des Pƌes͛ pƌeŵises, the HoloĐaust 
is meant to be taught, learned and memorialized in a disciplined manner and was believed that it can 
be mastered and never forgotten. However – and this is the third point –, as Shoshana Felman 
argues, from the 1980s psychoanalysis opened up new teaching possibilities, renewing both its core 
questions and practices and suggests that pedagogy, similarly to psychoanalysis, shall proceed 
thƌough ͞ďƌeak-throughs, leaps, discontinuities, regressions and deferred aĐtioŶ͟. As it folloǁs, 
instead of considering teaching as a hierarchical setup between students and teachers we shall take 
knowledge as essentially dialogic, as an exchange of thoughts.113 ͞Dialogue,͟ ǁƌites FelŵaŶ, ͞is thus 
the radical condition of learniŶg aŶd kŶoǁledge, the aŶalǇtiĐallǇ ĐoŶstitutiǀe ĐoŶditioŶ͟.114 By the 
same token the new generation of artists challenges the traditional pedagogical approach to the 
Holocaust. Their artworks shift the discourse from the historical, that is from documentation, from 
the desire for mastery and from testimony, to the imaginative and promote vision. 
 
 
Generations of post-Holocaust 
 
Fƌoŵ the ďegiŶŶiŶg of the ϭϵϴϬs, as the suƌǀiǀoƌ͛s geŶeƌatioŶ is passiŶg aǁaǇ, theƌe is ŵoƌe aŶd 
more focus on secondary witnesses, hence on the second or third generations and on the ways in 
which they attempt to approach the Holocaust. On the basis of the above I argue that in the 
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beginning of the 1980s one could have witnessed a paradigmatic change in the field of the 
representation of the Holocaust. Hence, the core questions of representation before the 1980s were 
how to transmit the knowledge of the traumatic experience in a way that is preserves its historical 
truth and authenticity? Also, what kind of form of representation would represent the trauma of the 
others in an ethically and aesthetically adequate way? Following the 1980s in the heart of the debate 
there was the question of how to use trauma of the survivors and of the later generation as a means 
to communicate or mediate the memory of the Holocaust to the later or secondary generations. New 
concepts came to the fore in order to deal with the traumatic experience as well as to keep the 
memory of the Holocaust alive.  
One of the most well-kŶoǁŶ ĐoŶĐepts is ͚postŵeŵory͛ introduced by Marianne Hirsch.115 Initially 
the concept was understood as a response of the second generation to the trauma of the first, hence 
as the second generation channels their parents memories into art. Memory is considered dynamic 
which is affected by and effects the present and the future. Later, the term has shifted focus from 
faŵilǇ stƌuĐtuƌes ďut theŶ ďƌoadeŶs it up to the affiliatiǀe stƌuĐtuƌes: ͞Ŷo ŵoƌe thaŶ aŶ eǆteŶsioŶ of 
the loosened familial structured occasioned by war and persecution. It is the result of the 
contemporaneity and generational connection with the literal second generation, combined with a 
set of structures of mediation that would be broadly available, appropriable, and indeed, compelling 
eŶough to eŶĐoŵpass a laƌgeƌ ĐolleĐtiǀe iŶ aŶ oƌgaŶiĐ ǁeď of tƌaŶsŵissioŶ.͟116 
According to the additional understanding of postmemory, the concept is broadened and 
becomes the reservoir of secondary witnessing. Postmemory denotes the identification with the 
traumatized victim as well as a latency, a belated and not first-hand experience of the traumatic 
event. HiƌsĐh is ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout the ďetteƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the past, thus ͚postŵeŵoƌǇ͛ – 
͞ƌetƌospeĐtiǀe ǁitŶessiŶg͟ – is explored by photography: encounter with the photography and re-
living the traumatic event in the visual domain has a traumatic effect117, however it is different from 
the suƌǀiǀoƌ͛s siŶĐe iŶstead of ƌe-experiencing it the secondary witness repeats the event. Repetition 
is iŶ the ĐeŶteƌ of HiƌsĐh͛s aƌguŵeŶts, siŶĐe she Đlaiŵs that it tƌaŶsfoƌŵs aesthetiĐs iŶto ethiĐs. As 
opposed to Andrea Liss, ǁho Đlaiŵs that the Đƌeatiǀe use of photogƌaphǇ ďǇ aƌtist Đause ͞pitfalls that 
tƌespass too heaǀilǇ thƌough postŵeŵoƌies͟118, or Barbie Zelizer119 and Geoffrey Hartman120, who 
disĐuss the deseŶsitiziŶg effeĐt of the ƌepetitioŶ of iŵages, HiƌsĐh aƌgues that ͞ƌepetition connects 
the second generation to the first, in its capacity to produce rather than screen the effect of trauma 
that was lived so much more directly as compulsive repetition by survivors and contemporary 
ǁitŶesses.͟121 
In the case of secondary witnesses repetition is not the means of retraumatization but a helpful 
ǀehiĐle of ͞tƌaŶsŵittiŶg aŶ iŶheƌited tƌauŵatiĐ past iŶ suĐh a ǁaǇ that it ĐaŶ ďe ǁoƌked thƌough,͟122 
as ǁell as Hoǁ do these iŵages aǀoid ƌetƌauŵatizatioŶ aŶd tƌaŶslate the ͞shoĐk of seeiŶg͟ into 
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ǁoƌkiŶg thƌough? The ƌepetitioŶ of iŵages has Ŷo ƌestoƌatiǀe atteŵpts, ͞it is oŶlǇ ǁheŶ theǇ aƌe 
deployed, in new texts and new contexts, that they regain a capacity to enable a postmemorial 
ǁoƌkiŶg thƌough.͟123 Hence, postmemory is not an identificatoƌǇ ŵodel, ͞it is ͚post͛͟124, but at the 
saŵe tiŵe ͞it appƌoǆiŵates ŵeŵoƌǇ iŶ its affeĐtiǀe aŶd psǇĐhiĐ effeĐts.͟125 
IŶ HiƌsĐh͛s uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg postŵeŵoƌǇ is a peƌsoŶalized ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of tƌauŵa ǁhiĐh eǀokes 
empathy in the secondary witnesses towards the victims without the appropriation of their identity. 
Architect Daniel Libeskind however considers trauma abstract which is linked to concepts such as 
exile or annihilation.126 His ĐoŶĐept ͚spaĐes of ŵeŵoƌǇ͛ ƌefleĐts upoŶ the eǆpeƌieŶĐe of the ŵateƌial 
dimension of trauma. Trauma is an architectural challenge that is built into architecture in the forms 
of void or cuts or sharp lines, while the secondary witnesses become subjected to the materiality of 
the trauma, to its physical, bodily and spatial sensation, by visiting the site and being exposed to it. 
The ǀoid, as LiďeskiŶd eǆplaiŶs, suggests the ǀeƌǇ liŵit of ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ: ͞The Ŷeed iŶ aƌĐhiteĐtuƌe 
to respond to the questions of culture, of public space, of the void is very palpable, since in 
architecture the void is a space. It is a place of being and nonbeing. It is a place where one can hardly 
find traces of a relationship. And yet, it is something which has been recorded and presented in light, 
matter, and documents. One can attempt to have access to it through names, addresses, through a 
kiŶd of hauŶtiŶg ƋualitǇ of spaĐes ǁhiĐh the passage of aďseŶĐe took plaĐe.͟127 Libeskind establishes 
site-specific buildings – let us think about the Garden of Exile in Berlin at the Jewish Museum – 
whose authenticity might be questioned by the survivors, although, as Libeskind suggests forgetting 
authenticity and instead practicing the creative reimagination of the authentic spaces. 
 
Besides AdoƌŶo͛s diĐtuŵ the fact that certain kind of aesthetics was exploited by the Nazis, 
hence aesthetics was an inherent component of the Fascist regime, and that the Holocaust was 
supposed to be unique, hence needed an equally unique aesthetic regime led to the demonization of 
aesthetics and beauty in the context of the Holocaust.128 Artists during the Holocaust produced 
works of art as an affirmation of life, as an act of witnessing, as a spiritual resistance through the 
asseƌtioŶ of iŶdiǀidualitǇ oƌ just to ŵeet the ĐlieŶt͛s Ŷeeds that is to paiŶt to the oƌdeƌ of the 
commanders.129 In the aftermath of the events they felt the innermost urgency to reflect upon what 
happeŶed aŶd deploǇed a ͞daƌk stǇle͟ that ǁas aŶtiƌealist ;i.e. the HoloĐaust is Ŷot kŶoǁaďle aŶd Ŷot 
representable), iconic and figurative based on the concepts of heroism (i.e. anti-fascism) and 
redemption. However from the 1970s the face of Nazism begun to change in the West and despite 
their varying tone, register and genre those artworks aimed to introduce a more authentic 
perception of the past that was also a critique to pervious representations.130 
It became clear that the operation of Nazism could not have been analyzed only from political, 
social or economic point of view but there was a need for a synthesis of divert interpretations as well 
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as for the inclusion of images and emotions. Aesthetics presents and interprets the past as well as 
helps to better understand the present.131 
BǇ the ϭϵϴϬs a Ŷeǁ geŶeƌatioŶ of aƌtists Đaŵe to the liŵelight ͞those ǁho ĐoŶfƌoŶt the hoƌƌoƌ of 
the Nazi genocide and the suffering of its victims, and who continues to bear witness through 
ƌeĐoŶfiguƌed foƌŵs of ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ testiŵoŶǇ to eǀeŶts theǇ haǀe Ŷeǀeƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐed͟.132 They 
rejected previous modes of representation and aimed to combine their relation to the past to its 
memory and in the meanwhile integrate the event in their life narrative. It is not about mourning or 
talking from the position of the traumatized victim but instead it is a political act, an identity struggle 
and an attempt to overcome the non-autonomous subjectivity of the victim and to gain control over 
the future.   
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